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Sixty years after the Suez crisis, is there anything else to be said about it? «Mil-
lions of words have been written about the causes and effects, the rights and 
wrongs» (Jackson, 2016:5) of this process. Yet, many of its secondary and even 
front line episodes remain obscure, not to mention some main evidences.1  
These gaps certainly result from the political embarrassment evolving most of 
its Western actors and the efficient policy of oblivion that followed the 9-months 
“crisis”. Nothing worth remembering and certainly nothing to commemorate, as the 
passing of is 60th anniversary will certainly show. 
Still, the Suez “affair” is probably the most significant turning point the Middle 
East political history between the Second World War and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. More than the 1967 war – another episode often referred as a hallmark– it 
meant the handover of hegemonic power in the region, from Britain to the United 
States. This outcome was immediately perceived by all. Many others were not, es-
pecially the fact that the major share of the Middle East oil had already slipped 
from British to American interests within the last previous years.  
The main goal of this chapter is to highlight major and minor aspects of this 
conflict using the point of view of Portuguese diplomatic sources. Portugal was one 
of the “18 Powers” that played a direct role in the diplomatic engineering of the 
Suez Affair. Its Foreign Minister files of the “crisis” extend from July 1956 up to 
the re-opening and “normalisation” of the Canal use in May 1957. No documents 
corresponding to the period of the military operations and the subsequent United 
Nations display in the canal are considered here. The bias resulting from this ap-
proach – giving the time gaps and the narrowness of its scope - is perhaps offset by 
                                                          
1 Such as the Sèvres Protocol, the minute of the secret conversations among the British, French 
and Isareli governments (22-24 October 1956) in order to invade Egypt. Of the original document 
three copies  were made:  the British one was  immediately destroyed, the French one got “lost” and 
the Israeli one, kept for 40 years in the Ben-Gourion personal archive, was for the first time displayed 
in a 1996 BBC documentary film (Shlaim, 2001, pp. 238;748). 
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the focus on a few forgotten political issues. 
To make the most of this information, the first three items aim to brief the broad 
lines of what was at stake in 1956: the control of the Middle Eastern oil, the geopoliti-
cal interests of the main state actors and the what the “Affair” meant up to the begin-
ning the Israeli invasion (29 October). These items deal with what may be called the 
major imperialistic contradictions, such as they can be inferred from the Portuguese 
sources and cuttings of the main-stream press. The last items focus the events, again 
such as they can be inferred from the Portuguese sources and focus only in the issue 
that divided the most the Western allies – the boycott to the Canal. They allow never-
theless for grasping the minor imperialistic contradictions of some “junior partners”. 
 
 
1 – Imperialism in the Middle East, 1956 
 
1.1. The Middle Eastern oil 
In 1956, the Middle East had already become the epicentre of the oil industry. 
The United States remained the major oil producer (42% of the crude output) but 
nearly half of its oil reserves were already used up. The future was elsewhere: it 
was estimated that «the discovered oil of the Middle East is nearly two-thirds of the 
proved reserves» of the Western world2. In spite of this potential, in 1943 the Mid-
dle East produced only 5.7% of the world output. Then and now, the importance of 
the Middle Eastern oil was not just a matter of volumes but rather of its cost of 
production - and of the differential rents that could be made out of it3. Oil corpora-
tions operating in the Middle East usually get higher rates of return than the ones 
operating elsewhere4 and capital in the oil industry gets higher rates of return be-
cause of marginal energy producers, such as most of the coal corporations. 
In 1944 an Anglo-American Petroleum Agreement had urged for a joint world 
exploitation but, as the US oil interests were openly against it, this protocol was 
never ratified (Dalemont & Carrié,1993, p. 66). In 1947 the majority of the Middle 
Eastern crude (79%) still belonged to the British corporations (Cliff, 1947, p.190). 
American capital had already joined the big Iraqi syndicate (the Iraq Petroleum 
Company, former Turkish Petroleum Company) and had meanwhile gained the 
Saudi and Bahrain concessions. As the oil exports of the Arabian peninsula were 
still small the US corporations controlled just 16% of the Middle East output. 
These positions changed very fast: 
                                                          
2 Middle Eastern Oil, Core of the Suez Problem. The New York Times, 23 September 1956. In 
1947 the US petroleum Administration for War still estimated that the Middle East would just have 
30.7% of the world proven reserves. (Cliff, 1947, p. 190). 
3 The commodities whose marginal producers (operating with the highest individual costs of pro-
duction) establish the market price provides an extra-profit (differential rent) to all the other capitals. 
4 «More than 13,000 barrels of oil have been proved per foot drilled in the Middle East, compared 
with twenty and thirty barrels in the United States, and between 600 and 700 barrels in Venezuela. In 
short, Middle Eastern oil is unbeatable». Middle Eastern Oil, Core of the Suez Problem. The New 
York Times, 23 September 1956. 




Within the decade following the end of the Second World War, American cor-
porations had come to own almost twice as the British5 share of the Middle Eastern 
oil.  
                                                          
5 The stock capital of Royal Dutch Shell was not fully British and so the British share of the oil 




1.2. Imperialist contradictions in the region 
The political control of the region did not change as fast as the oil output split. In 
1956, the “security” of the region was still mainly in charge of the United Kingdom. 
Corporate control and political power were thus unbalanced in the Middle East. 
In 1947 the Foreign Office had stated the US State Department that it could no 
longer cope with most of its responsibilities abroad (Isaacs & Taylor, 2008, p. 43). 
But the British withdrawal from the East Mediterranean (Greece, Turkey and Pal-
estine) did not apply to the oil-strategic positions hold in the Middle East: Egypt 
(the Suez Canal), Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait and the Trucial Coast. The empire had just 
been repositioned though at a high cost: defence spending in the 1950’s amounted 
to about 10% of value of British exports (Cain & Hopkins, 2002, pp. 630-631). 
This could not last for long and some kind of adjustment was inevitable.  
The French stand in the Middle East was simpler: the Compagnie Française du 
Pétrole’percentage amounted just to 6% of the 1956 region’s oil output, due to small 
shares still hold in the Iraqi, Qatar and the Iranian syndicates. Yet it was in France 
that the Suez invasion plan was achieved; France ended the “affair” as the sole major 
western power determined not to compromise with the Egyptian government. 
Thus, the Suez military option was a high-risk option taken by the 2nd and 3rd 
powers in the region, not by the first one. In fact, American interests in the region not 
only afforded but also required a more flexible approach to the rising nationalist 
forces in the Middle East. For instance, the “50-50” profit share formula implement-
ed by Aramco6 in Saudi Arabia – made possible by the tax bonus granted to the 
American oil firms back home - could not be easily matched by their European com-
petitors elsewhere. The experience of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 was 
there to show how much this handicap could cost to British capital (two years of Per-
sian oil boycott and the allowance for the Americans to enter the I.O.P7. syndicate). 
Moreover, the 50-50 split was soon to be overtaken: the agreements made by the 
“Independent” newcomers: American (Aminoil and Getty Oil in the Neutral Zone), 
the German C. Deilman Bergbau (in Yemen), the Japanese Arab Oil Exploration 
Company (in the Saudi off-shore) or the Italian ENI-Sirip (in Iran) were already 
pushing towards the 75-25 formula in “posted prices”. (Berreby,1958, pp. 248-249).  
The bargaining position of the Middle East rentier States towards the old oil syn-
dicates such as the I.P.C.8 could only be strengthened by this harsh competition. To 
prevent “further damage”, the use of force was more and more the option to protect 
British interests. During the 1951 nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian a military op-
eration was not implemented just because the British Cabinet did not want to take the 
risk of breaking with the United States «on an issue of this kind» (Kyle, 1991, p. 8). 
But the price of American mediations was henceforth a factor to be considered in fu-
ture threats to British stands. In the case of the Suez, as a Portuguese official put it: 
                                                          
6 Arabian American Oil Company.  
7 Iranian Oil Participants, Ltd. 
8 Iraq Petroleum Company, former Turkish Petroleum Company. 
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 It was much to be feared that if Nasser’s policies were to remain unpunished, great corporations 
such as the “Iraq Petroleum Company” or the “Kuwait Oil Company” might well consider embarking 
on nationalisation experiences9. 
 
In fact, Britain was already militarily engaged not to let “unpunished” the inter-
ests of the I.P.C. against Saudi Arabia since 1952. The Bureimi border conflict that 
opposed the British client sheiks of Oman and Abu-Dhabi to the Saudis was in fact 
an I.P.C. versus Aramco conflict. But while the British were militarily present behind 
the I.P.C. the Americans could use their Saudi proxy (Berreby, 1958, pp. 188-199).  
So, some often disregarded Middle East features of these years are: 
-to face the pressure of rising nationalisms, British power was now too weak to 
deter defies and too tied to local interests to assure all-encompassing protection for 
the constellation of Western oil corporations; 
-Saudi Arabia (Aramco) remained the main threat of the British oil interest in 
the Middle East during the years 1955-56. Saudi Arabia was the main Arab sup-
porter of the Egyptian regime10. This was an important factor of the US policy to-
wards Nasser in 1956; 
-In spite of the United States militarily absence in the region, American oil 
firms (either the Major or the “independents”) were already present in every Mid-
dle East oil-producing states, as table 1 clearly depicts.  
American interests were therefore much more complex to handle than, for in-
stance, the French one whose three priorities in the Arab countries were Algeria, 
Algeria and Algeria (Shlaim, 2001, p. 222). The big oil corporations, which had 
massively supported the Eisenhower election in 1952 and had placed two of his 
men as top officials (Allan Dulles in the CIA and J. Foster Dulles in the State De-
partment)11 were aware of that. In spite of all the anti-Soviet rhetoric, for instance, 
Washington preferred to let Britain expose herself alone to the rising Arab nation-
alism by forcing her Arab clients, Iraq and Jordan, to enter the CENTO12 treaty (in 
which there was a non-Arab majority). The CENTO suited the US policy against 
the Soviet Union (and against Arab nationalism) but an American participation 
therein in the wrong time – that is, with Britain still holding general responsibilities 
in the region - would had the negative side effect of mixing American interests and 
British policies. As Dulles put it: «it would have been disastrous for us in any plan 
in the Middle East if it seemed to be inspired by the British» (Kyle, 1991, p. 526). 
Besides, American soft power worked well in frequent colonialism-disengagement 
                                                          
9 AHD-MNE- Lucena, Relatório Anual, 1956, p. 4. 
10 The American press highlighted the support given to Nasser during the tripartite summit (Saudi 
Arabia, Syria and Egypt) of 22-24 September 1956. Communiqué of  Three Arab Leaders. The New 
York Times, 25 September 1956. 
11 For the connections of the brother Dulles with the oil lobbies (Scott, 2015, pp. 53-55). 
12 Central Treaty Organisation, also known as the Baghdad Pact. It had been s signed in 1955 by 
Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. 
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statements which drove the British Establishment-press mad13. Shortly, for the 
United States, the Middle East in 1956 was suitable for the old T. Roosevelt policy 
of «gentle words and a big stick». For Britain and France, it was soon to be proven 
that by then not even a big stick was enough. 
If the “junior” partners of the United States could not fully rely on the American 
support for their Middle East colonial interests, their strategies in the region were 
neither always convergent. British policy for Jordan, for instance, was one the fric-
tional points. London wanted to secure the Hashemite monarchy and in 1956 this 
implied to have Iraqi troops entering in Jordan. Because of her Israeli connections 
and of her Syrian dwindling interests, France was not keen to accept it and Israeli 
stated that it would be considered as an act of war. Tension was rising on this issue 
while the three respective chiefs of staff were secretly negotiating the invasion of 
Egypt14. That in spite of such deep conflicts of interest the Suez operation could be 
launched shows the how much the British and French governments already de-
pended on the military option to recover influence in the region. 
 
1.3. The real issue in the Suez affair 
On 19 July 1956 the US Secretary of State Dulles informed the Egyptian Em-
bassy in Washington that the American Government had decided to withdraw the 
loan-offer of USD $56 millions for the project of the Aswan Dam. This project 
stood at the core of Egyptian program of agrarian reform and industrialization; it 
had been resumed by the new Nasser regime and was supposed to grant it a wide 
social and political support. The following day the Egyptian Embassy in London 
was told that the British Government would also no longer hold the USD $15 mil-
lion loan due for the same purpose. On the 20 July the World Bank stated that on 
those conditions the USD $200 million loan to Egypt was cancelled15. 
The estimated cost of the Aswan project (including construction of the dam, 
power stations and land reclamation) by the Egyptian Government was of USD 
$690 million but international appraisers estimated it at nearer USD $1 million16. The 
State Department justified the American reverse of the loan-offer with doubts about 
whether Egyptian finances would be able to subscribe its capital share in the project. 
It was said that in April the Egyptian cotton output (roughly 75% of the country’s 
                                                          
13 Such as the State Department Secretary Dulles made at the height of the Suez crisis: «that the 
US cannot be expected «to identify itself 100 per cent either with the colonial Powers or the Powers 
uniquely concerned with the problem of getting independence as rapidly, and as fully as possible». He 
admitted to differences of approach by the three nations to the Suez dispute and added that «any areas 
encroaching in some form or manner on the problem of so-called colonialism found the US playing a 
somewhat independent role». US Mediatory Role in Shift from Colonialism. The Times, 03 October 
1956. 
14 AHD-MNE- Lucena, Relatório Anual, 1956, pp.31-33. 
15 AHD-MNE- Lucena, Relatório Anual, 1956, pp.1-2. 
16 Egypt Points with Pride to Smooth-Running Canal. The New York Times, 23 September 1956. 
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exports) had been mortgaged to pay for the arm deal with Czechoslovakia17. In fact, 
it was the deal itself (and the Cairo refusal to join the CENTO) rather than its impact 
on the Egyptian finances that irritated the State Department. Besides, being expected 
that left alone the Soviet Union would not keep her engagement to finance the As-
wan Dam, this would cause either the Nasser’s fall or, at least, the downgrading of 
the Soviets to the Non-aligned states. One week later, in the 26th of July, the Egyptian 
government found an alternative source of income by nationalizing the Suez Canal 
Company. Nasser’s speech in Alexandria on the 26 July explicitly linked the two is-
sues18. The American press agreed: the US loan refusal was the starting point of the 
“crisis”, at least its detonator19. According to some French views, American respon-
sibility had started even before and was much larger20. 
The Canal was owned by the “Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime du 
Suez”, whose capital stock was mainly French and British; its headquarters were in 
Paris. Nevertheless, the “Compagnie Universelle” was an Egyptian registered cor-
poration and had never had sovereignty rights over the canal. The seizure of its as-
sets by the Egyptian Government against proper compensation to the shareholders 
was thus perfectly legal. It juts meant anticipating the end of a concession, due for 
1968. This was known by all the parts involved even if not publicly admitted21 be-
cause, of course, that was not the point. 
The point was neither the free navigation in the Canal. In 1888, imperial powers 
had signed the Constantinople Convention that guaranteed the freedom of naviga-
tion of the Suez Canal. The Egypt Government became explicitly engaged to abide 
by it when it signed the 1954 treaty (by which the British forces would withdraw 
from Egyptian soil two years later) and kept repeating it in every official state-
                                                          
17 Paying the arms in cotton and rice was cheaper than paying in dollars or pounds. (Daumal and 
Leroy,1971, p. 105) 
18 «This year, from the $100 million net return of the Canal, Egypt got $ 3 million; the money will 
not keep flowing abroad; our money will build the Great Dam ...» (Daumal and Leroy,1971, pp. 107-
108) 
19 «American action has been too little or too late. It has been a series of improvisations and in-
consistencies (…) The State Department was well aware, from the reports of Ambassadors Caffery 
and Byroade, before the summit meeting in Geneva, that Nasser would seek arms and economic assis-
tance where he could find it». Too Little and Too Late.  New York Herald Tribune, .23 September 
1956. 
20  «America’s responsibility in the whole Affair can hardly be overstated. It was America that in-
flated Arab nationalism since 1951 making bids on British policy; it was America who pushed the 
British out of Egypt; it was American ambassadors who pushed Nasser to the top of the government; 
it was the State Department who changed tack about the Aswan Dam and gave the pretext for the na-
tionalisation of the Suez Canal».  Double Danger. Le Monde, 11 September 1956.  
21 As the 27 July 1956 Cabinet Minute the British Government clearly states: «From a narrow le-
gal point of view his (Nasser’s) action amounted to no more than a decision to buy out the sharehold-
ers». (Jackson, 2016, p. 18). Publicly (and even in NATO meetings such as the one the 5th of Sep-
tember) the British Government claimed that the seizure was illegal for not having been made without 
prior notice and because of the international status of the Company. Britain’ allies were aware of the 
juridical nullity  of the arguments, as the confidential report of  a Portuguese official confirms. AHD-
MNE – Coutinho,  A Aventura do Suez, p. 36. 
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ments after the 26 of July. Everyone knew that in the case of a boycott due to a 
single-country control of the canal, all the Western interests and especially Brit-
ain’s would be severely damaged. In 1955, out of 14.666 ships going through the 
Canal, 4.538 were British-registered (over 30%). Moreover, 75% of Britain’s oil 
consumption was carried along the Canal22. The British “principal requirement” (in 
official statements and in the main-stream press) was thus that «Canal should be 
insulated from politics of any one country»23. But it was known that the Egyptian 
government would never take the initiative of a Canal boycott because it would 
mean the end of the Aswan project, even admitting that Suez revenues would ever 
be enough for paying for it24. Besides, British allies were also aware that until 1954 
the control of the canal had never been insulated from Britain’s own policy: 
 
It should be said that Great Britain never looked favourably upon the Constantinople Convention 
and only in 1905 [that after 23 years of British Condominium in Egypt] had abide by all its articles 
and only because of French pressure. During the two World Wars she did not respect the Convention, 
hindering passage to enemy’s ships. She opposed twice to the project of internationalisation of the 
Canal. It was not easy to invoke the Convention unless Egypt repealed it and Nasser never showed 
any intention to do it25. 
 
The secondary argument that the Egyptian Government did not know how to 
run the Canal was even less suitable for a casus belli because it had yet to be prov-
en (and it never was)26. 
For some Portuguese officials there were no doubts of what was at stake. The 
freedom of navigation in the Canal was a pretext: Britain and France wanted to oc-
cupy it only to overthrow the Egyptian regime. The Cairo’s anti-imperialist influ-
ence irradiated eastwards (British CENTO client States) and westwards (French 
Algeria)27. Both countries were running out of time to topple Nasser. By the 1954 
agreement signed with Nasser, the last British troops were about to leave Egypt in 
June 1956. For the Foreign Office, the expectation that meanwhile CENTO could 
make pressure on Egypt was dashed by the 1955 anti-colonial rioting and the re-
sults of the 1956 election in Jordan. Instead of isolating the Nasser regime, Iraq had 
now become Britain’s only “safe” State in the region, apart from the Gulf sheiks. 
For Paris, as the war against the FLN28 entered into a political impasse, it became 
                                                          
22 AHD-MNE- Lucena, Relatório Anual, 1956, pg. 4. 
23 AHD-MNE – 2ºP, A.1, M. 478 - British Embassy in Lisbon, 29 April 1957. 
24 It was estimated if Egypt got all the canal tolls that were previously going to the Suez Company  
it would add USD $32 million, - much less than the annual $100 million referred by Nasser in his 26 
of July speech and still too little for the funding of the Aswan Dam.  Canal Seizure Threatens Egypt’s 
One-sided Economy. The New York Times, 23 September 1956. 
25 AHD-MNE- Lucena, Relatório Anual, 1956, pp. 12-13. 
26 Two months after the nationalization of the Canal, the passage of ships through the waterway had 
been sped up by reintroducing the three-convoy a day system. The Singapore Times, 25 September 1956. 
27 AHD-MNE- Coutinho, A Aventura do Suez, pp. 44-46. 
28 Front National de Libération, a platform of political movements that started the anti-colonial 
war in French Algeria since November 1954. 
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urgent to topple the Cairo regime, seen as the main military and political supporter 
of the Algerian nationalists29.  
To achieve it, British and French policy towards Israel had to be changed. Their 
1950 joint commitment with the United States in order to maintain the military sta-
tu quo between the Arab States and Israel was no longer convenient. Less engaged 
than the British in the Middle East, the French could move faster in that sense. In 
October 1955, the Paris Government started delivering their Mystère aircrafts order 
to Israel30. But it is now established that the secret summits between French and Is-
raeli top military officials proceeded regularly since 1954. The Israeli Chief of 
Staff had been pushing for a “preventive” war against Egypt since at least the end 
of 1955. In September 1956 top Israeli officials (M. Dayan and S. Peres) were al-
ready trying to fit it into the French move against Nasser. The Challe plan31 was the 
natural outcome of this convergent evolution (Shlaim, 2001, pp. 224-225). For the 
British, the Challe plan also came at the right time because there was the risk of en-
tering into two wars at the same time: against Egypt with Israel and against Israel 
with Jordan32. Of course none of these agreements were publicly known at the time 
but it could be noticed that the sequence of events was peculiar: «Israel began to 
mobilise [during the 3rd week of October] and there was the “feeling” that she 
would invade Jordan. On the 29 October the Israeli army invaded Egypt»33. 
 
 
2- The Suez diplomacy  
 
2.1 – The London Conferences before the S.C.U.A.34 (August-September 1956) 
The British government’s started planning the overthrow of the Egyptian re-
gime at least from the 29 July. On the 2 August, the Prime Minister Eden informed 
that «measures of military nature were in course», reservists were called up and 
joint Mediterranean manoeuvres with the French fleet were under way. This was 
meant to pressure the Cairo but, of course, it was not bluff. The first setback was 
that by the end of that week the two Cabinets were told that they could not count 
                                                          
29 «Nasser was the champion of the Arab world and if he could be toppled the psychological ef-
fect on the Algerian fighters would be decisive». AHD-MNE – Coutinho, A Aventura do Suez, p. 11. 
It was nevertheless unclear whether the Egyptian support to the FLN was more of an excuse to justify 
some of the French military upsets in Algeria. AHD-MNE, Lucena, Relatório Anual, 1956, p. 11 
30 That French’s priorities were others than the maintenance of Israeli-Arab military balance  is 
the fact that even after Nasser’s arm deal with Czechoslovakia, France promised to sell arms to Egypt 
it the Cairo “Voice of the Arabs” broadcasts towards Algeria was silenced. (Jackson, 2012, pp. 14-
15). 
31 The French general Maurice Challe designed the plan of the “preventive” war of Israeli against 
Egypt and the “mediation” of Britain and France). Shlaim, 2001, pp. 199-240. 
32 In that case, and if there was an American reaction to the Israeli aggression on Jordan/Arab side 
(which it was plausible considering the intimate connections of the USA and the Saudis), Britain «and 
the US would  be fighting on opposite sides». (Jackson, 2016, pp. 42.) 
33 AHD-MNE – Coutinho, A Aventura do Suez, p. 39. 
34 Suez Canal User’s Association.  
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on the American support for the «use of force». According to Portuguese sources 
the American stand in the forthcoming talks among the “three Powers” in London 
can be summarised like this: 
- “yes” to sanctions and credit cuts to Egypt; “maybe” to American ships stop 
paying the Canal tolls directly to Egypt (though the US Government could not im-
pose it to the shipping companies); “no” to a premature United Nations debate; 
 - a single step to be immediately taken: in order to mobilise public opinion and 
to give Britain and France a “majority mandate” to deal with the Nasser regime, an 
international conference of the Canal’s users should be called35.  
London and Paris expected more but they could use the idea of the Conference. 
The military operations could not be implemented before September; meanwhile an 
international conference could produce a legitimate but unacceptable note (“a vir-
tual ultimatum”) to the Egyptian Government36.  
The Conference invited 24 States to gather in London and took place from Au-
gust 16 to 23. Egypt and Greece refused to participate (Greece because of the Cy-
prus conflict with Britain). Eden later explained at a NATO summit the criterion 
used for the invitations: the 8 signatories of the Constantinople Convention, the 8 
major users of the Canal (in tonnage) and the 8 countries with a major external 
trade dependence on the Canal37. Portugal was probably invited under the last crite-
rion but as regards oil supplies surely applied also to the third. Anyway, the invita-
tions had been made just to assure a majority for the Anglo-American plan38. This 
was the case: the approved resolution stood for 18 states and urged for «the estab-
lishment of international in place of Egyptian control over the Suez Canal, and stipu-
lating for sanctions»39. Dissidence came only from India, Ceylon and Indonesia – 
that demanded direct negotiations with Egypt - and from the Soviet Union. Nasser 
could not accept the «collective colonialism»40 of the “18 Powers” and, as expected, 
the proposal was turned down. The Anglo-French had already their casus belli. 
So far, so good but for Britain and France the next steps would be harder. There 
was a planned next step: «a users’ association to be organized by the 18 sponsors 
of the proposal» to run the Canal and collect the tolls41. Eden announced it in the 
                                                          
35 AHD-MNE, Lucena, Relatório Anual, 1956, pp. 16-17. 
36 From the minute of the Egyptian Committee of the London Cabinet: «If Colonel Nasser refused 
to accept it, military operations would then proceed» (Jackson, 2016, p. 26). 
37 AHD-MNE – 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478.  NATO - Procès-verbal de la reunion du Conseil tenue au 
Palais de Chaillot, 05 September 1956. 
38 AHD-MNE, Lucena, Relatório Anual, pp. 17-18. 
39 On 8 September the “proposal” was presented in Cairo by a five-power Committee that had a 
selected Afro-Asian majority (USA, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia). It was  headed by R. Men-
zies, the Australian Prime Minister. AHD-MNE – 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478. Egyptian Legacy in Lisbon – 
Diplomatic note. 
40 Menzies verbal report of the “5 Power-mission” stated that the failure of the mission should be 
laid upon Nasser’s prejudices and slogans such like this one. AHD-MNE – 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478. Por-
tugal Embassy in London, 11 September 1956. 
41 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478. USA- Information Service., Dulles Press Conference of 13 
September 1956. 
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British Parliament on the 12 September but it was not a secret that the plan had 
come from Washington42. The same day the British Embassy invited the “18 Pow-
ers” to join the new organisation and three days later invited them to a second Lon-
don Conference43.  
From this moment onwards the main paths took different directions. The US 
Secretary Dulles had envisaged the two London conferences and the plan of the in-
ternationalisation of the canal «but for him that should be the basis for negotiating. 
Britain and France wanted that to be the minimum demand»44. In short, for the 
Americans the London conferences and the user’s association that came out of it 
were a device to avoid war and for the Anglo-French a device for the legitimating 
of war. To make things worse the difference was now made public by the Ameri-
can Government through press-conferences of the President Eisenhower and of 
Dulles himself. From the one of 13 September in which the later gave details about 
the future user’s association, the press (and the Portuguese Embassy in Washing-
ton) took special note of the following excerpt:  
 
Mr. Secretary, the British press today says that Britain plans to use an armed convoy to go 
through the Canal (…) Would the US support Britain in such a venture? - Well, I don't know what 
you mean by “support”: I have said that the US did not intend itself to try to shoot its way through the 
Canal45. 
 
As soon as the agenda of the 2nd Conference was made public the Egyptian gov-
ernment stated its total rejection of a user’s association that implied «threats to 
peace»46. In Cairo it was clear that the internationalisation of the canal was meant 
to by pass the payment of tolls to Egypt (and ultimately to cover military action). 
The Egyptian government was trying to organise a parallel international confer-
ence, which would force the canal users to choose camps. In a public speech Nas-
ser had already spoken about guerrilla warfare in the Canal47. No wonder that dur-
ing the week of the call for the second London Conference the great majority of the 
“18 Powers” signatories of the Menzies proposal had serious doubts of what to do. 
The Portuguese Government, for instance, wanted primarily to know what conse-
quences Washington would draw from an Egyptian blockade of the Canal48. In a 
draft dispatch of questions to be made to the Foreign Office it was also asked, un-
der the cover of juridical doubts about linking the 1888 Convention and the user’s 
association, if it was intended to go to war and what obligations this would imply 
                                                          
42 Dulles admitted publicly that «there has been given very intensive thought here in Washington, 
but not by just the Department of State». AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç USA- Information Service, 
Dulles Press Conference of 13 September 1956, p. 7. 
43 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, British Embassy in Lisbon, 12 and 15 September 1956. 
44 AHD-MNE, Lucena, Relatório Anual, p. 17. 
45 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478. USA- Information Service, Dulles Press Conference of 13 
September 1956, p. 12; Portugal Embassy in Washington, 13 September 1956. 
46 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Egyptian Legacy in Lisbon, 17 September 1956. 
47 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Legacy in  Cairo, 15 September 1956 
48 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 12 September 1956.  
M. Santos 
102 
for the user’s association members49. That is why Dulles’s reassurance that Ameri-
ca would not go «shooting its way through the Canal» came as first deflator of the 
tension and certainly saved the 2nd London Conference. But by disengaging the 
United States from any military initiative, he was pushing the Anglo-French to a 
narrower path on which they could hardly “go along” for much more time50.  
Dulles just wanted of a «small operating staff which would be ready to assist 
our ships» and to collect tolls but kept the door open to negotiate with Nasser (the 
new body would assure the Egyptian government a share of the Canal revenue)51. 
The Anglo-French, who still had some time to waste in diplomatic solutions they 
did not care about (their planned landing, due for Alexandria the 15 September had 
been changed for a Port Said landing52) still «went along». For all the others, the 
main issues before the Conference were: 
- what if Egypt refused access to the ships that were not paying directly to the 
Suez Canal Authority (the Egyptian agency recently created to run the Canal)?  
- did the belonging to the user’s association implied adhering to the boycott of 
the Canal? 
- was there going to be some sort of mutual compensation for those (States of 
ships companies) who decided not pay Egypt?  
- how was to be funded the running expenditure of the user’s association? 
The second London Conference opened on 19 September. Four days before the 
Portuguese Ambassador Teotónio Pereira had a private conversation with Selwyn 
Lloyd, the British Foreign Minister, in which the Dulles reassuring statements were 
confirmed. Lloyd still expected that American ships would enter the Suez refusing 
to pay Egypt and were forced to reroute around the Cape so that another casus belli 
would arise53. Pereira was therefore told that Dulles pacifist statements would not 
deter the Anglo-French. On the other hand, “nothing” (i.e., military duties) was ex-
pected from the allies54. The Portuguese were also more aware of the deep gap be-
tween the Anglo-French and the Americans: their Ambassador in Washington was 
plainly told by Dulles that the user’s association device was just meant to hinder 
the Anglo-French from having only two options, war or capitulation55.The Confer-
                                                          
49 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Ministry, Draft Minute, Questions to be 
made in London, (…) 12 September 1956. 
50 Eden did not think much of the American idea of the User’s association «but if it brings the 
Americans in, I can go along» (Jackson, 2016, p. 20).   
51 «Is this association to be charged solely with the operation of the waterway or are Egyptian 
agencies to be recognised for operation of canal equipment on the land? I would say that there is no 
thought in my mind whatever that this agency would attempt to supersede the Egyptian authorities as 
they handle the canal equipment on land – the signalling stations, the operation of the draw bridges, 
and the like» AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, USA- Information Service, Dulles 2nd Statement. 
52 The change of plan took place only on the 10 of September.  Jackson, 2016: 29-30. 
53 Certainly based on official sources, a pro-governmental Portuguese newspaper published the 
next day the description of a supposed plan of an American Guinea pig ship sent to the Canal to be 
blocked by the Egyptians. Diario de Noticias, 15 September 1956. 
54 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 14 September 1956. 
55 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in Washington, 18 September 1956. 
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ence validated that the use of force was out of the question, approved the interna-
tional operative body now labelled S.C.U.A., and ratified the toll refusal to Egypt56.  
 
2.2. The S.C.U.A. and the failure of the first boycott (September-October 1956) 
If force was not to be used and Egypt refused to give way to ships not paying 
tolls to her authorities, there was going to be a boycott of the Canal. In that case, 
the costs would be very unequally shared.  
As regards the Middle east oil producers, it was estimated that a blockade of the 
Suez would imply production cuts of about 0,5 out of an output of 3,5 millions bar-
rels per day. British interests would be the most harmed: Saudi Arabia could al-
ways increase its exports to the Asian markets, Iran had assigned quotas because of 
the recent I.O.P. agreement, Iraq had its own pipelines to the Mediterranean and so 
the majority of cuts would be imposed on Kuwait (the Middle East major oil pro-
ducer and special reserve of British Petroleum)57.  
As regards oil consumption, Britain would also suffer the most. In 1956 about 
80% of European oil consumption depended on imports from the Middle East and 
more than half of it came through Suez. In Europe, the United Kingdom was the 
chief Middle East oil importer58. 
 
Table 2 – Middle Eastern Oil in Europe (millions of barrels per day) – year 
1955 
 
A - Total Euro-
pean consumption of 
oil  
B - Oil Imports 
from the Middle 
East  
C – Oil Imports 
from the Middle 
East passing the 
Canal 
 
B / A (%) C / A (%) 
2 364.1 1 880 1 100 80 47 
Source: The New York Times, 23-09-1956 
 
A boycott of the canal could be afforded by the United States, whose Middle 
Eastern oil imports were roughly 3% of the American consumption, but not by 
Britain. With the majority of the British press against it the London Government 
accepted the idea because, as it is known, it had something else going on. However 
if the boycott was to come, it had to be short and effective.  
By then, British and French shipping companies were still paying dues to the 
old Suez Canal Company outside Egypt59. Many others, such as the Portuguese 
                                                          
56 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Statement of the London Conference, 21 September 1956. 
57 Es casi seguro que Egipto cerrara el Canal de Suez a la Associacion de Usuarios. El Univer-
sal, 01 October 1956. 
58 Middle Eastern Oil – Core of the Suez Problem. The New York Times, 23 September 1956. 
59 That was certainly a dangerous situation that urged Dulles to stop it: «So far President Nasser 
has been letting boats go through, although many of them are not paying effectively anything for the 
privilege of going through. How long will he allow that? I do not know». AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, 
Mç 478, USA - Information Service, 19 September 1956. 
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ones, had already switched payments to the Egyptian Government account. About 
35% of the tolls were already being paid in Egypt, directly or under clearance 
agreements such as Italy had. It was plain to see why: for a ship of 28,000 tons (an 
average oil tanker), the additional expenditure of the Cape route over the Suez tolls 
could be estimated in 32%.60Martino, the Italian Foreign Minister, reminded that 
24% of the oil refining industry was now centred in Italy and that eight Italian 
shipping lines were using the Canal, «some of which could not possibly reroute 
round the Cape, and would go inevitably out of business if the canal was boycott-
ed». The Scandinavian countries and West Germany presented similar objections61. 
The Greek and American ships flying the flags of the Panama (12% in 1955), Libe-
ria (7% in 1955) would hardly follow the boycott.  
It did not take long to realize that as long as the payment of tolls to the S.C.U.A. 
was not mandatory, the pressure of the boycott on the Egyptian Government would 
be irrelevant62.To counter this, the American engagement was at first expected to 
be decisive. Before going to London, Dulles had said that the United States would 
not «try to bring about a concerted boycotting of the Canal» but assured that: 
- the American ships would be instructed to avoid the Canal; 
-to the European countries boycotting and with a dollar-gap, the Export-Import 
Bank would provide loans for the purchase of American oil63.  
About the first pledge it is not likely that Dulles, an oil-man and who had al-
ready stated that the US Government had no power to force shipping companies, 
wanted to make much more than statements64. But that was not clear at the time 
and for some of the 18-Powers dragged into the venture (by NATO commitments 
and by their own colonial policies, like Portugal) some difficult times involving 
double-standard statements were about to begin. The Portuguese diplomacy may be 
used as a proxy to most of the remaining 18. 
Right at the end of the 2nd London Conference, Paulo Cunha, the Portuguese 
Foreign Minister that had personally attended, was pleased to point out that it had 
been possible, 
 
by giving new features to the association and stressing the voluntarily character of the user members within 
it, to do away with the risk of a near canal boycott which, once in course, would cause serious upsets in oil 
                                                          
60 Dulles urges Nasser to Help Effort. The Baltimore Sun, 23 September 1956. 
61 18-Power Declaration on Suez. The Times, 22 September 1956. 
62 As Egypt’s share of the tolls under the “Compagnie du Suez” administration amounted only to 
7%, it was figured out that not even a full boycott would have impact upon the Egyptian budget. El 
Universal, 01 October 1956. 
63 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, USA- Information Service, Dulles Press Conference of 13 
September 1956, pp. 4-5.  
64 Though some of these statements were masterpieces of diplomatic language: «Immediately up-
on my return steps will be taken with our Treasury officials and with the representatives of owners of 
American Flag vessels which largely transit the Suez Canal with a view to perfecting this co-
operation in terms of actual operating practices». AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, USA - Infor-
mation Service, Dulles to Sewin Lloyd, 21 September 1956. 
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supplies; at least for now we can expect that our tankers will keep passing throughout the Canal65. 
 
However, on the 26 September the Portuguese Embassy in London reported 
about the pressure of the Anglo-French on the US Government to make it compel 
American ships not to pay tolls to Egypt. «So far there has been no reference to 
Portugal» but things could change fast. The Ambassador was alarmed enough to 
suggest that Portuguese shipping companies should centre their Egyptian accounts 
to zero and start paying as they did before, i.e., by cheques on London or Paris. 
Two days later a relief telegram was sent to Lisbon: the list published by the “Daily 
Telegraph” of countries paying tolls to Egypt «does not mention us»66.  
Paulo Cunha sustained his reassuring view: the matter should be let as it was (a pri-
vate decision of the shipping companies). Considering that at the Conference neither 
the United States had moved forward any kind of boycott/support aid, nor the British 
Government had in any way pleaded for it, it would be «inconceivable» that once the 
Conference was over, «we were expected, on our own initiative and without aid assur-
ances, to change the system of toll payments, risking the Egyptian objection»67. 
To keep it this way, the Portuguese Government had to be sure that the 
S.C.U.A. administration remained controlled by the prevailing will among the 18 – 
that is, a non-mandatory toll payment system.  
A third London Conference was due for the 1 October to formally organise the 
S.C.U.A. Right on the note in which Lisbon confirmed accessing, it was added that 
the Portuguese Government «reserved the right to intervene in the redaction of the 
statutory rules»68. Lisbon had no interest in be part of Executive bodies, in pointing 
out names for that purpose or in hosting the association but insisted in two principles: 
-that all political resolutions should be of the exclusive responsibility of the 
Plenary Council (if the statutory norms were to be redacted by a small Committee 
the Plenary should have always the final word);  
-«that nothing would be done to invalidate the doctrine, established at the 2nd 
London Conference, that the State members and it ships were fully free not to use 
the Association’s services for crossing the Canal and that toll payments to the As-
sociation would only occur voluntarily»69. 
                                                          
65 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 22 September 1956. In  the first 
half of 1956, the Portuguese oil demand was supplied by 28 round –trips in the Canal  (17 Portuguese 
and 11 freighted tankers) totalling 462,424 tons of crude,  which must have corresponded to 95% of 
the oil consumption in that period. AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Informação, 08 January 1957, p. 
2; SACOR, Relatório e Contas, 31 December 1956. 
66 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 26 September 1956; 28 Sep-
tember 1956. 
67 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 28 September 1956. 
68 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 27 September 1956. 
69 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 29 September 1956. There was 
also a private avail: before going to London Dulles had already told the Portuguese Ambassador that 
ships of the User’s association might well continue passing  the Canal because he was not all confi-
dent that a concerted boycott would  make Nasser to give in. AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portu-
guese Embassy in Washington, 18 September 1956. 
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The focus put on Plenary decisions laid also on the argument that a «small 
Committee should not be allowed to decide about the financial contribution of each 
member, assessment system and magnitude of expenditure of the Association». 
The Portuguese Government suspected that the French wanted to transfer liabilities 
of the former “Compagnie Universelle” to the S.C.U.A., mainly the wage expendi-
ture with her dismissed Canal pilots70.  
In his telegram reply, T. Pereira assured Lisbon that it would be feasible to op-
pose to the French debt transfer and to keep membership expenditure within the fi-
nancial terms sent by Lisbon. However, he was not so sure about the tolls issue. Ex-
cept for the United States ships and for dummy companies of Panama’s and Liberia, 
the only major fleets paying directly to Egypt were now the German and the Italian. 
His telegram hinted again a subtle disagreement with the Minister: «One may won-
der if it was not preferable that our shipping companies had not rushed to accept the 
new regime. It is predictable that behind the scenes of the Conference a strong lobby-
ing will made upon the association members not to pay Egypt». Moreover, the who’s 
who of the boycott would soon become known: «S.C.U.A. staff will be called to 
closely look upon who, where and why such tolls (are being) paid. It will be seen that 
some of those who are paying directly could very easily do it otherwise if they really 
wanted». And to show that personal view was based on principles rather than on the 
fear of a Portuguese insulation, he added:  
 
I do not believe that we will lack companionship for our two shipping companies stand but I just 
wonder if they could not voluntarily and gradually take another route71. 
 
In Pereira’s dissent it is possible to grasp the traditional Salazar (and Portugal’s) 
traditional reliance on the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, which the new generation of 
the Minister and of his entourage tended to pragmatically downgrade72. But Pereira 
was right about the expected pressure. That was why the composition of the Execu-
tive bodies could no be completely indifferent to Lisbon. The discreet support given 
by the Portuguese delegate to the Italian appliance to the Board was thus a natural 
outcome. On 2 of October Pereira was asked by the Italian Ambassador to support it.  
 
He told me that Italy was much more interested in the seat than in taking the S.C.U.A. headquar-
ters to Rome. About the toll payments he told me that France was deeply outraged (as we already 
knew) because of Martino’s statements and that very strong pressures had been made on the Italian 
delegation. Italy was in a difficult situation because she had a clearance agreement with Egypt with a 
large deficit. Three years of payments would not be enough to cover it73. 
 
On the last day of the Conference, Italy got the seat in spite of the French open 
                                                          
70 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 28 September 1956. 
71 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 29 September 1956. 
72 T. Pereira was considered a close political proxy of Salazar while P. Cunha had been appointed 
by Marcelo Caetano, the future Salazar’s successor in 1968. 
73 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 02 October 1956. 
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opposition and «we did not have to face much difficulties»74. Almost a month later, 
the Portuguese Foreign Ministry «still had no elements» pointing to a change of 
stand and Portuguese companies kept paying only to the Egyptian Agency. Cunha 
justified it this way: «The problem of liquid fuel is so acute and delicate that only 
under exceptional circumstances, still not occurring, should the Government order 
those Companies to stop paying Egypt». 
Besides, several of the “18 Powers” (including the United States) were doing the 
same and «since the main interested States had not yet undertaken actions with a new 
common solution, we must keep waiting». Thus, only if a massive Western platform 
was gathered with that purpose or under the framework of a formal demand, «we 
should consider this problem otherwise». And in that case, «we would require to be 
informed about the kind of aid that we could expect to find in those main interested 
countries as regards defaults in oil supplies». In short, «we do not exclude a change 
of policy» if all the others change it but «we must not get ahead»75.  
It is to be remarked that by then nobody no longer was paying attention to Dul-
les’s other pledge in the 2nd London Conference (and repeated in private conversa-
tions)76: the American “aid” to the boycotters. Neither the State Department really 
wanted to sustain it because of the costs involved77 nor did the majority of the “18 
Powers” really wanted to use it, at least for a boycott. 
On the 25 October, the Portuguese Ambassador in London still considered that 
the US stand remained the «principal open question»78. But for the Anglo-French 
(Governments and main press) there were no doubts about it almost a month ago79: 
                                                          
74 «France demanded that Italy, by entering the Executive Body, took the engagement of stop pay-
ing tolls to Egypt. Italy escaped under the Machiavellian procedure of taking the engagement so far as 
every other executive members (which included the United States) proceed the same way. (…) It was 
relatively easy for us to avoid too much explanations about how we are paying tolls». AHD-MNE - 2º 
P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 06 October 1956 
75 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 23 October 1956 
76 The charm operation before the 2nd London conference included conversations like the one in 
which a top American official requested the Portuguese Foreign Ministry a draft evaluation of the 
Portuguese demand for oil and tankers. «I asked what was the purpose. He told me – stressing the 
“confidential” and “personal level” of the information – that they had got a State Department cable 
asking for it». AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Ministry,  Note, 15 September 
1956.  Dulles had also told the Portuguese Ambassador before going to London that the Department 
of State  had been studying for two months the device of the dollar-loans for oil. AHD-MNE - 2º P., 
A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in Washington, 18 September 1956. 
77 «As a US Senator commented recently: the cost of putting Nasser in his place seems to have 
skyrocketed from 40 million a year to half a million». Nimble Diplomacy in London. New York Her-
ald Tribune, 24 September 1956. Nevertheless, the project interested Standard Oil of New Jersey and 
it was certainly not by Dulles’s fault that it did no go ahead: in  times of an oil buyer’s market the 
prospect «of running down their East-coast deposits» (Kyle, 1991, p. 523) through Federal loans to 
the Europeans certainly pleased the big oil interests. 
78AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 25 October 1956. 
79 Using the pretext of Dulles’s recent statements linking the Suez issue to “colonialism”, the An-
glo-French were about to «abandon the existing alliance». AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portu-
guese Embassy in Washington, 03 October 1956.  
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the State Department had deliberately turned the boycott plan into a stillbirth80. On 
the 2 October Dulles had already felt obliged to deny any that the United Stats 
were trying a separate deal with Egypt81. London and Paris took their first public 
actions again the State Department, such as going to the United Nations. Therein 
they did not better because from the debate came out a quasi consensual Declara-
tion (the Six Principles) that would drive them back into direct negotiations with 
Egypt82. They were now ready to try something different.  
On 29 October the Israeli invasion of the Suez started and it was followed by 
the Canal wreckage obstruction. The toll issue would not be raised again until 
March 1957, when the Canal was reopened. When it did situation on the ground 
was much different. 
 
2.3. The S.C.U.A after the failed invasion (December 1956-May 1957) 
Until 1956, the imperialist statu quo in the Middle East suited the American big 
oil interests. They had been cheaply safeguarded under Britain’s “security” while 
making advances at her expense. But Britain had been less and less able to hold the 
job83 and her blunt Suez adventure jeopardized it definitely. After the Suez inva-
sion, it was no longer possible to fit the interests of American oil corporations that 
were present in every oil-producing Middle Eastern States with the protection of 
the second most hated European power in the region (the French were probably the 
first). The 1957 Eisenhower doctrine84 was designed to meet the requirements of 
the changing situation. By explicitly assuming military duties in the Middle East, 
the US Government readjusted the unbalanced oil share and political control that 
had lasted in the region for a decade. But “filling the vacuum” left (this time invol-
untarily) by the British also meant that the American policy was now able to focus 
in the anti-colonial Arab nationalism which so far had been left for the British to 
handle. That was not only possible but also necessary because the American’s main 
client State, Saudi Arabia, could not stand alone against the rising tide that would 
come out of a Nasser’s triumph. Thus, the handover of imperialist powers in the 
region implied also rebalancing the power among the Arab states. In short, the 
1956-57 turning-points implied other adjustments, which would only be accom-
plished during the years 1967-70 (Corm, 1983, pp. 45-40). Portuguese officials 
                                                          
80 «Since then [1st London Conference]Mr Dulles has indicated that in all essential matters, such 
as use of pilots, payment of dues, passage itself of the canal, the user's association is to have no real 
powers of collective bargaining but the master of each ship is in most cases to be left to fend for him-
self». Distorting the Isses. The Times, 03 October 1956. 
81 US Mediatory Role in Shift From Colonialism. The Times, 03 October 1956. 
82The 4th Princip read: «4. The manner of fixing tolls and charges shall be decided by agreement 
between Egypt and the users». AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, United Nations, Security Council, 
13 October 1956. 
83 Dulles praised Britain’s century-long action «against Czarist and now Soviet ambitions» (Kyle, 
1991, p. 529) but the paradox of being such a “bulwark” for the protection of American interests was 
much recent. 
84 Labelled after the Eisenhower’s speech of 5 January 1957, «Special Message to the Con-
gress on the Situation in the Middle East». 
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could not but enjoy the change: 
 
The so called “Eisenhower Doctrine” for the Middle East allows for the United States to follow 
the excellent precedent of the “Truman Doctrine” of 1947 (…) The revolt of the Nasserites in Jordan 
against the King was unexpectedly choked with the support provided by the Iraqis and mainly by 
King Saud (who so far seemed unable to counter Nasser). This was the first political defeat of the So-
viet policy in the Middle East in recent times and it is expected that many others may follow85. 
 
Although the desired effect of countering the Arab nationalism was not as rapid 
as it looked86, it was a fact that the American policy on the Suez issue was different 
immediately after the invasion. The Americans still had to keep distance from the 
Anglo-French but some pressure on Nasser was now at hand without endangering, 
rather pleasing, the Saudis. On the other hand, the Egyptian Government let it be 
known that it did not want tripartite negotiations (with Britain and France) and fa-
voured a broader negotiating body «with two or three other countries, which should 
not be the Great Powers»87. This asked for the reanimation of S.C.U.A. right from 
December 1956. So far the User’s Association had been useless to every interested 
part (it had neither prevented war as the State Department wanted nor achieved any 
Egyptian concession as the Anglo-French had for some time had expected). The 
Americans wanted to keep it anyway because it could be now used to press Egypt. 
The second life of S.C.U.A. started with an American proposal for the Associa-
tion «to undertake a study of the possible establishment of a priority system» once 
the shipping in the Canal was resumed. It was expected that at the outset only «a 
single channel will be opened to a depth of 25 feet throughout the length of the Ca-
nal» and so «only fifty percent of the pre-crisis volume of traffic should be ac-
commodated»88. This would affect Portugal’s oil traffic in the Canal because her 
full tankers in the return trip would exceed the 25th feet depth but not her Indian 
traffic89. But more than the assessment system it was the mission of S.C.U.A. itself 
that caused much of the discussion. For the moment, the Americans wanted it as an 
advisory body90 while the French were far from wanting «a passive body, whose 
                                                          
85 AHD-MNE – Coutinho,  A Aventura do Suez, pgs. 49-50. 
86 The optimistic point of view of this Portuguese Cairo report is worth quoting: «It should be 
considered that: the nationalization of the Canal produced in the Arab bourgeoisie a reaction that is 
pushing its Governments to insulate the Cairo; this way the old quarrels between the Saudis and Jor-
dan and Iraqi dynasty are over; States that were apart such as Libya and Lebanon, Turkey and Sudan 
make arrangements among themselves without consulting the Egyptian Government; an African con-
ference in Khartoum is being organized and the old claim that Egypt should lead is not increasing but 
fading away». AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Legacy in Cairo, 29-03-1957. 
87 Norway, owner of the one of the largest merchant navies, was to be one of those countries. 
AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, SCUA/II/57PSR/1, 10 January 1957. 
88AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, American Embassy in London, 28 December 1956. 
89 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Informação, 08 January 1957, pp. 2-3. 
90 «It is United States view that if SCUA is to continue, and prove important in the future of the ca-
nal, its best chance is by becoming the central source of all available information regarding the canal, its 
traffic and the service through it, which information should be made available as required to the United 
Nations and to interested parties». AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, SCUA/II/57/D/4, 10-01-1957 
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mission would be one of study». They were now openly in collusion route with the 
Americans91. 
The cordon sanitaire that the American Administration wanted to keep from the 
Anglo-French invasion passed also along the S.C.U.A. when it came to salvage op-
erations in the Canal. A Memorandum presented by France and Britain assured that 
the «addition of Anglo-French vessels would at least double the working capacity 
immediately». However, the Egyptian refusal to accept it until the complete evacu-
ation of the expeditionary forces was not disputed within the User’s association and 
the Anglo-French proposal was archived92. 
The salvage operations took less than expected and from March onwards the is-
sue of the Canal boycott was raised again. The British Cabinet was aware that if the 
Canal clearance was achieved before an agreement with Egypt had been made, 
there would be no conditions «to give boycott any chance of success» (Kyle, 1991, 
p. 544). Forestalling any S.C.U.A. move, on the 18 of March the Egyptian Gov-
ernment issued a Note reiterating its commitment to abide by the Constantinople 
Convention, that rises of dues would also abide by the 1936 Agreement (i.e., not 
superior to 1% each year) and, of course, that «Canal tolls are to be paid in advance 
to the Suez Canal Authority in Egypt, or its nominees»93. A few days later, talks 
conducted by the United Nations and the American Administration started in Cai-
ro94. A last (and necessarily short) push was on the way but this time the Anglo-
French would enjoy some more American backing. The astonishment caused by 
the State Department’s new approach on the most of the “18 powers” was consid-
erable. In the telegram sent from the Portuguese Embassy in Washington informing 
about the Western reaction to the Egyptian Note, the excerpt: «Main idea United 
States is boycott Suez Canal. Under Trading Enemy Act Government may forbid 
US citizens, whatever flag ship-owners to pay tolls Egyptian Authorities» was in 
Lisbon underlined in red and sided with a huge question mark95. But, surprising as 
it was, the Portuguese Ambassador was not wrong: from the18 of Mars to the 27 of 
April a new tandem, this time Anglo-American, tried discretely to bluff a second 
boycott (the French were discreetly kept at bay). On the 9 April, the Portuguese 
Ambassador in London confirmed the Washington telegram: the Foreign Office 
secretary had informed him that they were doing «all they can to suspend all pas-
                                                          
91 France wanted now to get back to Dulle’s first idea: «The Suez Canal Users' Association should 
also undertake as was provided in The Declaration of 21 of September, Paragraph 6, the study of the 
means that may render it feasible to reduce dependence on the Canal and especially the building of new 
pipelines». The French delegate «recalled the reservation which his Government had made when they 
joined the Association, and added that present circumstances seemed to lend weight to these misgivings 
on the part of the French Government». AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, SCUA/II/57/D/4, 10 January 
1957. 
92 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, SCUA/II/57/D/5, 10-01-1957. «The Representative of the 
United States said that it was his understanding that the French and British statements were submitted 
for information only». AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, SCUA/II/57PSR/1, 10 January 1957 
93 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Egyptian Government, 18 March 1957. 
94 Nasser’s Terms. The Times, 25 April 1957. 
95 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in Washington, 22 March 1957. 
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sages of the main countries for at least 10 to 15 days» and that the «United States 
have been pressing as much as possible their ship-owners flying Liberia or Panama 
flags to stop all passages»96. According to the same Embassy, the International 
Chamber of Shipping could assure a boycott of around 80%, a figure never heard 
of during the September-October boycott attempts97. These were alarming signals 
for the Portuguese Government although by then Lisbon already knew that this 
time the boycott was planned to last only a couple of days. Anyway, it was always 
possible to get back to old scheme, as the cabled instructions sent by the Minister 
to his London Ambassador on 10 April clearly show: 
 
Your Excellency should mention that [Portuguese] shipping companies just accepted the Gov-
ernment plea to stop crossing [the Canal] for a short time. It must not be shown that the Government 
has the authority to impose it. In fact, it may occur that we need to let our ships go and pay Egypt un-
der the cover that Companies proceed that way under no Government responsibility (as we did during 
the Suez crisis before the closure of the Canal); and so our explicit thesis must keep showing that 
what the Government can do is to appeal to the good will of the Companies.98 
 
On the next day, the British Ambassador in Lisbon acknowledged in a discreet 
“Bout de papier” that two Portuguese ships had already been instructed to reroute the 
Canal, that the Belgians were pressing her two shipping companies to do the same 
and, most important, that «talks conducted by the American Ambassador in Cairo» 
were on-going with the Egyptian Government. The “quasi-Note” ended like this:  
 
We are not contemplating a formal boycott nor is it intended that the policy of restraint should 
continue for more than a limited time. But now is the time to exert all possible pressure on the Egyp-
tian Government, and the coming days will be crucial for the long-term interest of the users99. 
 
To give the American talks enough time the S.C.U.A. meeting due for 17 of April 
was postponed. On the 20 of April there were rumours that something had been 
achieved in Cairo and that American ships would pass the Canal paying tolls to 
Egypt (though still under protest just like they had done from August to October 
last). Time was not on the Anglo-American side and it was feared that the Egyptian 
concessions made by Nasser’s «phraseology» were just meant to extend negotiations 
until the number of passages through the Canal afforded him to switch them off for 
good100. In fact, the cracks were coming in: on the 19 April the first British ship, the 
“West Breeze” crossed the Canal paying tolls to the Egyptians authorities (worst still, 
                                                          
96 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 09 April 1957. 
97 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 06 April 1957. 
98  Portuguese Foreign Minister, 10 April 1957. 
99 To make it  less formal but no less credible, the Ambassador Stirling had crossed out “Aide-
Memoire” and explained that unwttingly the Embassy staff had redacted as such. AHD-MNE - 2º P., 
A. 1, Mç 478, British Ambassy in Lisbon, 11 April 1957.  
100 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 20 April 1957. 
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in Swiss francs!) and a next one, the “Poplar Hill” was about to do the same101.  
On the 24 of April, the Egyptian Government issued a revised version of the Suez 
Canal regime that came out of the “American talks” in Cairo. The most significant 
addition to the 18 of Mars Note was that the Suez Canal Authority and the National 
Bank of Egypt were negotiating with the Bank of International Settlement «to accept 
on its behalf payment of the Canal tolls»102. The Americans insistence on “some-
thing” to recognise the internationalisation of the Canal (Kyle, 1991, p. 544) in order 
to lessen the unilateral Egyptian settlement had achieved as much as this: to have the 
tolls deposit in a clearance institution owned by central banks. In fact, even this con-
cession was already implicit in the 18 of March Egyptian Note103.  
Anyway this was enough for the State Department: Egypt had come closer to 
the “Six Principles” of the UN Declaration of 13 of October and that had been 
achieved through bilateral and almost exclusive American mediation.104 That fitted 
the Eisenhower Doctrine and on the 27 of April Egypt was given a US “de facto 
acquiescence” (the Canal running could now enter a probationary period)105. The 
American green light was followed by a landslide within S.C.U.A, whose most of 
its members were now decided to cross the Canal under the Egyptian terms106. 
But it was not enough for the Foreign Office. From the 27 of April to 13 of May 
the British Government continued its efforts to stop the crossings. It was not alone 
because it now formed a most unlikely new tandem with Portugal for that purpose 
(the French were unconditionally pro-boycott but were no longer concerting their 
action with London). The same day of the American “acquiescence” at the United 
Nations, the British Ambassador delivered the S.CU.A. Members a sort of enquiry 
in which the first question suggested that the boycott attempt should proceed with-
out United Nations and United States participation107. Two days later the Minister 
Paulo Cunha replied that Portugal favoured negotiations without the United States 
                                                          
101 The Note of the British Embassy added that the «West Breeze (in spite of her reassuring name) 
was charter to a Hong Kong firm whose main function is trading with Communist China». AHD-
MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, British Ambassy in Lisbon, 20 April 1957. 
102 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Egyptian Government, 24 April 1957. 
103 L. Fernandes, the Portuguese Ambassador had already remarked that the reference to «Canal 
authorities or its nominees (…) would allow Nasser a graceful way out before the Arab public opin-
ion». AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in Washington, 22 March1957. Brandei-
ro, in charge of the Cairo Legacy had also reported on 1 April that a Swiss-based bank would be se-
lected. AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Legacy in Cairo, 1 April 1957. 
104 The United Nations financial negotiator had been John McCloy, chairman of the Chase Man-
hattan Bank, closely associated with the Standard Oil constellation (Kyle, 1991, p. 544) 
105  AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, USA- Information Service, Statement of Ambassador Cabot 
Lodge at the UN Security Council, 27 April 1957. 
106 Italy and Spain openly acknowledge that their ships were already using the Canal. AHD-MNE 
- 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 30 April 1957. 
107 «Do Users favour negotiations with Egypt? If so, what negotiating machinery would be appro-
priate? (Should it be done by Secretary General of the United Nations, by United States or by a nego-
tiating committee, or under cover of future debates in Security Council?» AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, 
Mç 478, British Embassy in Lisbon, Aide-Memoire, 27 April 1957. 
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and so the continuation of the boycott until further agreement with Egypt108. On the 
1 of May, the British Embassy informed that London was calling for another Unit-
ed Nations debate for the 6 of May and so «will continue to urge Portuguese ship-
owners to avoid use of the Canal»109. That is, Britain asked for another week for a 
last round of bilateral talks with Egypt.  
The S.C.U.A. was now useless for that purpose. Informing about the S.C.U.A. 
meeting of the 2 of May, in which Britain was left almost alone on the issue of ex-
tending the negotiations, the Portuguese Ambassador could say: «I am sure that all 
the resistance will end by next week»110. In fact, it did, at least in S.C.U.A. where 
prevailed a consensual will to settle the matter on the basis of the American pro-
posal: that passing the Canal under protest did not imply to accept the Egyptian’s 
terms. This did not prevent the Portuguese delegate from saying that Lisbon main-
tained the point of view that only through a tough and far-reaching stand with 
Egypt would be possible to get the «indispensable guarantees»111.  
The S.C.U.A. last episodes are apparently odd. Something had made Britain 
press Egypt again without her senior partner’s agreement (and at a time the British 
Government was doing his best for a US-UK rapprochement)112; at the same time 
Portugal was holding hard-line positions in S.C.U.A. which were utterly against 
her previous low-profile of toll-payer to Egypt. 
 
2.4. Dual diplomacy at the S.C.U.A – two cases 
British and Portuguese foreign policies during the last period of the Suez “af-
fair” are examples of dual diplomacy worth considering more closely.  
The first one because it touches a crucial aspect of the imperialist power: the in-
ternational currency. The dollar-pound competition is a least spoken factor of the 
Anglo-American policies in the Middle East and surely a forgotten item in the Suez 
crisis but it is a major element of understanding both of them113.  
As Portuguese diplomatic sources were central to the selection of facts shown 
above, it seems consequent to give them further use by analysing Portuguese stand 
itself. Portugal had by then colonial territories and Portugal’s main interest in 
Egyptian politics was directly linked with Portuguese colonial policy. This might 
be considered a minor aspect compared to the Anglo-American relationship. Still, 
connecting the Suez crisis to colonial policies other than the British and French 
ones may also contribute for a broader view on late colonialism. It is obvious that 
                                                          
108 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 29 April 1957. 
109 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, British Embassy in Lisbon, 01 May 1957. 
110 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 02 May 1957. 
111 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 08 May 1957. 
112 In Parliament Macmillan talked about «the closer association of the United States with the 
Baghdad Pact, and to what I hope will be fruitful and success cooperation between the great oil com-
panies of the western world. So what has happened has led to greater, and not less, Anglo-American 
cooperation in the Middle East. (Opposition laughter.)» Prime Minister’s Defence. The Times, 16-05-
1957. 
113 For a recent synthesis on petrodollars versus the euro, see Clark, 2006. 
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in both cases what follows in this last item is little more than the naming of sub-
jects liable to further research. 
 
a) Britain 
Most of the dual diplomacy of the “Affair” was unsophisticated and did not 
worked out nwell. Britain’s use of the UN and of the S.C.U.A. to cover military ac-
tion was exposed in real time, with some relevant media exceptions114. But the later 
weeks of British dual diplomacy the goal was different and she got what it wanted.  
Britain was aware that after the United Statements of the 27 of April at the UN no 
effective boycott was possible; still Egypt was not fully assured about the all the 
S.C.U.A. members and the situation could drag on. There was something that Egypt 
could give in exchange for a British final appeasement and for which Britain could 
never count on American backing: that the Suez Canal toll be paid in sterling.  
The international recovering of the sterling was for the British ruling class (the 
City) more important than anything else «even the future of empire which, it was 
assumed, would fall into place once the prior financial problem was solved» British 
finance capital was trying once more to give London a chance to become the world 
market for non-dollar trade and this implied to hold the convertibility of the ster-
ling, gradually introduced between 1955 and 1958 (Cain & Hopkins, 2001, p. 626). 
The payment of the canal dues in dollars or any other currency would cause a con-
siderable drain of gold and currency for the British banking system that would cer-
tainly harm the sterling convertibility. 
Delivered on the same day that the Americans gave Cairo a green light at the 
UN, the British 27 of April Aide-Memoire included this paragraph: 
 
3. Her Majesty’s Government requires information on the question of the possible use of transfer-
able Sterling for payment of the Canal Dues and has initiated a pure technical enquiry through Bank-
ing channels in terms which make it clear that it is made without prejudice to Her Majesty’s Govern-
ment’s ultimate decision on the use of Canal by British shipping. This enquiry is of the most confi-
dential nature115. 
 
That is, Britain was counting pounds among her S.C.U.A. allies while urging 
them to boycott. Having settled the main lines of the “affair” with Egypt, the For-
eign Office delivered the Portuguese Ministry another “Confidential” Note, two 
days before the Parliamentary debate in which the Prime Minister Macmillan let 
down Britain’s opposition to the use of the Canal. The Note thanked the «staunch 
support given by the Portuguese Government» but informed that the British Cabi-
net had given further consideration to the use of the Canal: boycott was no longer 
possible. Besides, 
 
                                                          
114 As this excerpt about the Anglo-French intervention in the United Nations shows: «This move 
is an earnest of the good faith and good intention of the Western powers. They are trying to exhaust 
every peaceful means of settlement». Suez and the U.N. The New York Times, 24 September 1956. 
115 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, British Embassy in Lisbon, Aide-Memoire, 27 April 1957. 
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the United Kingdom has a particular problem which is not common to the members of the Suez Canal 
Users Association as a whole, namely that sterling was not specified by the Egyptian Government as a 
currency in which dues could be paid. Provided that this problem can be resolved, Her Majesty’s Gov-
ernment propose to announce next Monday (May 13) the withdraw of their present advice to shipping.  
 
The “problem” was solved on time. In Parliament, Macmillan made public that 
«Payments made in connexion with the canal – for canal dues and other purposes 
such as port dues, or water – will be made in sterling». And more: a new transfera-
ble account had been opened in the Bank of England in the name of the national 
Bank of Egypt116. In fact, even this time this last minute dual diplomacy did not go 
completely under covered in the press. After the Parliamentary debate, the Con-
servative but non-City connected Daily Telegraph put it bluntly: 
 
Dues are to be paid in sterling, and a special transferable account has be opened from the purpose. 
Obviously, there is economy advantage to ourselves in not having to pay in hard currency, as had 
been feared; having decided that we must swallow the pill, we succeeded in getting it sugar-coated. 
But this does not detract from Nasser’s political victory117. 
 
b) Portugal 
In 1955 the new Egyptian regime looked up for inspiration in the “New State” 
Portuguese Constitution118 but this could hardly lessen Lisbon’s suspicion of the 
Egyptian Afro-Asian policies. It was not a coincidence that Portugal and Belgium 
were two of the European States more opposed to changes in their African colonies 
and more hostile to the Cairo “Voice of the Arabs” Radio. However, the stand of the 
Belgium towards the Egyptian Government corresponded more to what should be 
expected from a colonial metropolis119. Contrary to what Paul H. Spaak, the Belgium 
Foreign Minister demanded early in September 1956 (nothing less than NATO back-
ing for a military operation against the Cairo)120, the Portuguese diplomats made 
since the beginning of the Suez crisis reassuring statements towards Egypt. 
Right after Portugal’s entrance to the “18 Powers”, Brandeiro, then in charge of 
the Cairo Legacy, was asked by the Egyptians if the Portuguese participation in 
such a scheme mean that «qu'il est pour la guerre». Brandeiro’s reply was that de-
cision about entering the S.C.U.A. was not yet taken but that if Portugal did enter, 
                                                          
116 This new account would be free from the British Government interference. The previous ac-
count of the National Bank of Egypt in the Bank of England had been frozen and remained so «until 
satisfactory arrangements covering all financial claims against Egypt. (Laughter.)» But even the older 
was now allowed to make payments for British exporters who had entered in contracts with Egypt 
before 28 July 1956. British Ships to Use Suez. Payment in Sterling. The Times, 14 May 1957. 
117 Humiliation and After. The Daily Telegraph, 14 May 1957. 
118 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 477, Portuguese Legacy in Cairo, 14 December1955. 
119 «(Mr. Spaak at the Belgium Senate.) He said that any kind of success, whatever small, of Colonel 
Nasser would bring serious consequences for the West (…) As for Belgium in particular, the problem of 
Congo will arise sooner or later. Nasser’s self confidence, if inflated, will know no limits and the blow 
suffered by Western Powers will get to the heart of the African Continent (should be read: Congo)». 
AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in Brussels, 21 September 1956. 
120 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, NATO, Minute of the Board Meeting, 9 September 1956. 
M. Santos 
116 
«it would be because in our view such plan would not lead to war». Portugal was 
for a «peaceful solution»121. 
That was not false and the Portuguese delegate in NATO was pleased to report 
the positive contribution of the British Labour Party (!) and the Soviet (!) state-
ments had recently given to the peace cause122. It was seen supra the importance 
the Portuguese Government gave to prior guarantees that there would be no duties 
implicated by participation in the second London Conference. Paulo Cunha himself 
went to Paris before going to London because he wanted to meet Pineau [the 
French Foreign Minister] first, «considering the dubious character» of the London 
Conference (it was obvious that the French would be the most openly pro-war par-
ticipants)123. The Portuguese Government was also more than aware that a possible 
colonial turmoil could follow its entering into a war coalition against an Afro-
Asian country124. 
In the Conference, the Portuguese Minister reiterated that Lisbon would join a 
User’s Association only if it mean the «permanent continuity of the peaceful and 
legitimate action» of the first (!) Conference. The anti-war arguments used by 
Cunha were so emphatic (he said that at first he thought the association idea was 
“provocative” for Egypt)125 that important international media, including the Asian 
press, highlighted them. It is hard to see this as a totally involuntarily effect be-
cause some of the versions issued by Portuguese colonial media were similar126. 
This was meant to produce these results: 
 
The intervention of our Minister at the second Suez conference caused a very good impression in 
Cairo, whose political “milieu” were pleased to see how highly Portugal considered Egypt’s sover-
eignty. (…) The newspaper Al Goumorieh, close to the Government and which is sometimes unpleas-
ant for us says in banner headlines: Portugal supports Dulles’s good faith on the condition there is 
collaboration with Egypt127. 
 
                                                          
121 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Legacy in Cairo, 14 September 1956. 
122 The question mark sided along this dispatch that was added by the Ministry staff was of the 
same size of the text. AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, NATO, Portuguese Delegation in Paris, 15 
September 1956.  
123 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 16 September 1956. 
124 The Soviet Note sent to the Portuguese Foreign Ministry later made it explicit: «If a foreign 
invasion of Egypt occurs, it is sure that (…) it would cause a deep outrage among the African and 
Asian peoples against the Governments of the countries involved in such aggression». AHD-MNE - 
2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Soviet Embassy in Paris, 17 September 1956. 
125 The Ministry felt obliged to ask to the London Embassy for the correct version because the 
Censorship Services (to which the Portuguese Press was obliged to undergo) had «contradictory ver-
sions» of the Minister’s speech. AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 20 
September 1956; Portuguese Foreign Minister, 20 September 1956. 
126 The Portuguese-controlled Goa Radio today appealed to the Western Powers to «bury» the 
idea of a Suez Canal User's Association, which will surely lead to a world conflagration. The Radio, 
which was reviewing the Suez problem in its Gujarati broadcast, said Britain and France would do 
well to bury the user's plan once and for all and attempt to settle the problem through peaceful negoti-
ations.. Lisbon Attacks West’s Plan. The Indian Express, 20 September 1956. 
127 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Legacy in Cairo, 22 September 1956. 
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It was also seen supra how the Portuguese shipping companies had immediately 
switched their Suez toll payments to the Egyptian authorities and continued doing 
so until the blockade of the Canal in November. The Portuguese Government deci-
sion of not interfering was not only justified by the additional freights or the possi-
ble oil rationing. There was an additional cause for “upsets” in the Canal:  
 
The liquid fuels are not the only sensitive issue for us: there is also the civil and military transit to 
Goa128 and the problems arising from the fact that Egypt is currently our mediator in several of our 
difficult business with the Indian Union129. 
 
The Egypt Government was playing this broker role because the Indian Union 
was one of its main supporters and because the New Delhi claims over Portuguese 
colonial territories in India had led to the break of diplomatic relations in 1955. The 
Canal was of course a key factor: during the first semester of 1956, 10 round trips 
of Portuguese ships to Mormugão (the main port of Goa) had passed the Canal.  
The Portuguese stand became difficult to hold in April 1957 during the second 
boycott attempt. On the eve of the troubles, Brandeiro had a conversation with 
Mahmoud Fawzi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister in which the Egyptian reassuranc-
es were too explicit and repeated to be just casual: 
 
Referring explicitly to Portugal and after highlighting the Portugal’s moderate and sensitive stand 
in the Canal affair, he told me that he wanted to reassure me that the Egyptian Government, in spite of 
his good relations with the Indian Union would not hinder nor comment in any way the passage of 
ships transporting troops to Goa, because he was sure that the Portuguese Government did not nourish 
imperialist goals. He added that this statement would not be made public neither in Cairo nor in New 
Delhi but that he could fully reassured me that it would be so. He repeated me: «Egypt will not be 
against the passage of Portuguese troops throughout the Canal». I thanked the Minister. 
 
Egypt knew that Portugal could be easily pressed on this issue and Portugal was 
now made aware that Egypt knew. This is an important factor to understand why 
the Portuguese Government tried so hard to extend the negotiations with Egypt be-
yond the point the American Administration and later the Foreign Office had 
walked out of it. The Portuguese colonial government did not want to be left alone 
to become dependent of a Canal «non insulated from one’s country politics». It was 
more than plausible that once there was no more international control of any sort 
over the Canal, the Egyptian close relations to India would sooner or later reverse 
Dr. Fawzi guarantees about the passage of Portuguese ships. So, after the 27 of 
April once again a dangerous double game had to be played by Portuguese diplo-
macy: to make her best to support whoever was pressing Egypt (until the 13 May it 
                                                          
128 Goa was the capital of “Estado Português da India”, an ensemble of colonial territories in India 
that also included Damão and Diu in the Gujrat. In 1954 he Indian Union had already occupied two of 
those territories, Dadrá and Nagar-Haveli.  
129 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, 22 September 1956; 28 Sep-
tember 1956. In the first half of 1956, 10 round trips  of cargo and passenger ships were made be-
tween Lisbon and Goa. AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Informação, 08-01-1957, p. 2 
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was Britain) and to keep it as discreet as it could be. It is interesting to see how the 
argument used before to justify that Portuguese companies were paying tolls to 
Egypt «because the Portuguese Government had no authority to hinder it» (which 
was false) could be reverted if now, as it was the case, the boycott was to proceed. 
In a private note to Stirling, the British Ambassador in Lisbon, Cunha commented 
this way an episode of the late S.C.U.A. meeting: 
 
According to what Ambassador Pereira told at the meeting we do not have in Portugal legal au-
thority to force the companies to boycott the Canal but we do have the moral force to be sure that 
those Companies would abide by it. The Portuguese Government was ready to make this step if the 
great bulk of Users did the same130. 
 
This passage resembled the Italian stand during the S.C.U.A. meeting of Octo-
ber 1956 (see above 2.2) but this time it did not go so well. Egypt got his way, 
there was no boycott and worst still, the Cairo came to know about the Portuguese 
new stand. On the 10 of May the “Daily Express” published the following list of  
 
which countries in the User’s Association will send their ships through Suez now: 
Almost certainly – The U.S., Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Turkey, Persia 
and Holland. 
Probably – Britain, Australia and New Zealand. 
Probably not: Portugal.  
Definitely not: France131. 
 
Pereira tried to explain the leak, «certainly based on the statements we made at 
S.C.U.A and which strongly contrast with prevailing mildness of the majority»132. 





The Suez “Affair” allowed for the readjustment of hegemonic power in the 
Middle East. The American oil interests were progressing therein for the last three 
decades but until then the United States had no political or military responsibilities 
in the region proportional to its size. Henceforth American imperialism would be 
the umbrella for the minor European ones.  
This was not to happen without frictions: the smaller any former colonial metrop-
olis was the harder it became for her to rely on a super Power whose global interests 
had more complex issues to balance. Reporting what the American press said about a 
recent visit to France of Dulles, the Portuguese Ambassador selected this topic: 
 
To the question raised by Mollet [the French Prime-Minister] that under the terms of the Egyptian 
                                                          
130 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Foreign Minister, private note, 06 May 1957. 
131 Who Goes? «The Daily Express», 10 May 1957. 
132 AHD-MNE - 2º P., A. 1, Mç 478, Portuguese Embassy in London, 10 May 1957. 
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Memorandum [of 24th April] Nasser will control the Canal, the American Secretary of State replied 
that the Suez problem is not vital and can be solved with big tankers around the Cape or by building 
new pipelines. The problem of Suez, added Dulles, is part of the Middle East problem which in turn is 
part of the general combat between East and West. 
 
Fernandes added: «He seems not to have convinced Mollet and Pineau who in-
sisted that such issue should be dealt separately»133. 
The French and Portuguese colonial withdrawals did not take long after the Su-
ez (Argelia,1962; Portuguese India, 1961). The problems of fading colonial em-
pires were now lesser contradictions of a rising hyper-imperialism. That these mi-
nor contradictions were still important can be clearly seen when it comes to the er-
ratic trend of the S.C.U.A. boycotts: only national strategies were followed, as the 
cases of Britain and Portugal show. 
But the Suez crisis impacted the correlation of forces in the Middle East in a 
twofold way: if it consolidated the amalgamation of “Western interests” it also al-
lowed for the breaking of any potential anti-Western front. By assuming the impe-
rial delegation in full charge, the American Administration was freer from regional 
ties than the British had been. This allowed for a better selection of friends and foes 
that accelerated the class struggle within each Middle Eastern state; there would be 
no unified Arab bourgeoisie and no more conditions for a consensual pan-Arabism. 
 Sixty years later, both trends seem on going. It is hard to say for how much 
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